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OFF-KEY REGULATION: EXAMINING THE SEC’S AND THE
DOL’S DISSONANT REGULATION OF BROKER-DEALERS
ABSTRACT
In 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) forecasted that conflicted
investment advice provided by broker-dealers may cause IRA investors in the
mutual funds segment alone to lose upwards of $189 billion over the next ten
years and $404 billion over the next twenty. In the same year, the DOL under
the Obama Administration issued a final rule, known as the “fiduciary rule,”
that aimed to prevent losses due to conflicted investment advice by expanding
the meaning of “fiduciary” as defined in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). This rule would have required broker-dealers who
provide personalized investment advice to satisfy fiduciary standards of
conduct, rather than the currently enforced, less stringent suitability standard.
But after nearly a year and a half of an uncertain fate under the Trump
Administration, the rule was vacated in March 2018 by the Fifth Circuit, which
held that the DOL exceeded its authority under ERISA in promulgating the rule.
With the Trump-era DOL choosing not to appeal the decision, and third-party
efforts to do so failing, the rule is officially dead. And with the DOL’s efforts to
elevate to fiduciary status those broker-dealers who provide personalized
conflicted investment advice to investors halted, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is now the lone agency working to promulgate a standard
that could help save retirement investors billions.
After surveying the origins and development of federal securities law and
current legislation and regulation governing both broker-dealers and
investment advisers, this Comment argues that the SEC should impose a uniform
fiduciary standard on broker-dealers and investment advisers who provide
personalized investment advice. It also argues that the SEC should collaborate
with the DOL to create interagency enforcement guidelines, which will help to
resolve the growing tension between the SEC’s and the DOL’s regulatory
agendas and ultimately better protect investors. Until the SEC acts, retirement
investors will continue to suffer unnecessary losses on their investments.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2015, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) reported that
retirement investors lose approximately $17 billion each year due to receiving
investment advice from broker-dealers who have a conflict of interest.1 The CEA
also reported that affected investors lose approximately 1% in investment
returns annually.2 A year later, in April 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL)
estimated that underperformance due to conflicted investment advice could
cause individual retirement account (IRA) investors in the mutual funds segment
alone to lose up to $189 billion over the next ten years and $404 billion over the
next twenty.3
To mitigate these losses, the DOL under the Obama Administration
promulgated a final rule, known as the “fiduciary rule.”4 The primary purpose
of this rule was to prevent broker-dealers from providing investment advice
when they have a conflict of interest;5 in other words, the fiduciary rule aimed
to prevent broker-dealers from providing investment advice that is influenced
by their ability to profit, not their customers’ ability to do so. The practical
consequence of this rule would have been to elevate broker-dealers, who usually
must adhere to a lower standard of conduct, known as the suitability standard,
to fiduciary status.6 As fiduciaries, broker-dealers would have been required to
act in their customers’ best interest, as opposed to an interest suitable to their
customers, which is the current standard.7
The applicable date of the fiduciary rule was originally scheduled for April
2017.8 But in early February 2017, just weeks after taking office, President
Trump signed a memorandum calling on the DOL to reassess the Obama
Administration’s fiduciary rule.9 Specifically, President Trump directed the

1
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED
INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS].
2
Id.
3
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,946, 20,950 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
4
Id. at 20,946–47.
5
Id.
6
See id. at 20,946; FINRA Manual: Contents: Rule 2111, FINRA (May 1, 2014) [hereinafter FINRA
Manual], http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859.
7
See Section I.B.2.c.
8
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 20,946.
9
Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President, U.S., to Edward Hugler, Acting Sec’y of Labor, U.S.
Dep’t of Labor (Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Trump Memorandum], https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule/.
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DOL to review (1) whether the final rule was consistent with the policies of his
Administration, and (2) how it would affect retirement investors’ access to
financial advice.10 To provide more time to conduct its analysis, the DOL
delayed the effective date for full implementation of the rule and its exemptions
from January 2018 to July 2019.11
President Trump’s memorandum and the DOL’s ensuing delay in
implementing the fiduciary rule as passed not only afforded the DOL additional
time to assess the merits of the fiduciary rule, but also had two additional
consequences. First, it provided the courts more time to determine whether the
DOL exceeded its authority under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) in promulgating the fiduciary rule. Although the Tenth
Circuit had upheld the fiduciary rule just days earlier,12 the Fifth Circuit vacated
the rule in toto in mid-March 2018.13 The DOL had until the end of April to file
an appeal, but it chose not to,14 and third-party efforts to intervene were denied
by the Fifth Circuit.15 Thus, the fiduciary rule is officially dead, halting the DOL
in its tracks and forcing other interested parties, like academics and professional
interest groups, to rethink their arguments either for or against the DOL
promulgating its fiduciary rule.16
Second, the delay afforded the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
additional time to consider the merits of imposing a uniform fiduciary standard
that could apply to all broker-dealers who provide personalized investment
10

Id.
Ashlea Ebeling, The DOL Fiduciary Rule: A Timeline, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 11:59 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/03/23/the-dol-fiduciary-rule-a-timeline/#773dedf329a1; Nick
Thornton, Fiduciary Rule Officially Delayed to July 1, 2019, BENEFITSPRO (Nov. 27, 2017, 10:14 AM),
http://www.benefitspro.com/2017/11/27/fiduciary-rule-officially-delayed-to-july-1-2019.
12
Market Synergy Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 676, 678–79 (10th Cir. 2018); Tracey
Longo, Appeals Court Upholds DOL Rule, but Battle Continues, FIN. ADVISOR (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.famag.com/news/appeals-court-upholds-dol-rule--but-battle-continues-37636.html.
13
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 379 (5th Cir. 2018)
(explaining in a 2-to-1 split decision that the DOL exceeded its authority under ERISA).
14
Mark Schoeff Jr., 5th Circuit Denies AARP, States Motion to Defend DOL Fiduciary Rule, INV. NEWS
(May 2, 2018, 1:59 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180502/FREE/180509980/5th-circuitdenies-aarp-states-motion-to-defend-dol-fiduciary-rule.
15
Emily Brill, 5th Circuit Won’t Rethink Invalidation of DOL Fiduciary Rule, LAW360 (May 2, 2018,
9:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1039563.
16
Compare, e.g., S. Burcu Avci et al., How Should Retirement Plans Be Organized?, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 337, 345 (2017) (arguing that the DOL’s fiduciary rule does not go far enough and proposing that “only
passive index funds or well-diversified exchange traded funds (ETFs) consisting of broadly diversified
portfolios, such as ETFs that track the S&P 500 Index, [should] be allowed the tax exemption as retirement
accounts”), with Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 TUL.
L. REV. 339, 346 (2017) (arguing that “the fiduciary rule imperils investors in ways that are not immediately
evident”).
11
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advice.17 The rule being vacated cleared the slate for a possible SEC rule
unimpeded by the DOL’s fiduciary rule. Indeed, only a month after the fiduciary
rule was initially vacated, the SEC proposed multiple rules in mid-April 2018,
one of which was called Regulation Best Interest.18 The SEC’s movement here
was and is significant because, while the DOL believed it had the authority to
modify the standard of conduct for financial advisers of nearly $19 trillion in
retirement assets under ERISA19 until the Fifth Circuit rejected such a statement
of authority, the SEC’s authority to regulate financial advisers is far greater,
covering nearly $67 trillion in investment assets.20 Academics and professional
interest groups have also debated the merits of an SEC-imposed uniform
fiduciary standard.21
Despite the significant amount of literature dedicated to analyzing whether
the DOL fiduciary rule was valid or whether the SEC should promulgate its own
uniform fiduciary standard, scholars have not identified how the SEC and DOL
can collaborate to resolve their overlap in regulatory authority and failed efforts
to diverge in policy. This Comment argues for collaboration between the
agencies as the means for resolving the growing tension between their regulation
of broker-dealers and investment advisers.

17
Jay Clayton, Testimony on Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operation, and Budget, SEC (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-examining-secs-agenda-operation-and-budget (explaining that
the SEC has been reviewing options for imposing new standards of conduct on investment professionals, namely
broker-dealers and investment advisers).
18
Tim Keehan, SEC Proposes Best Interest Regulations for Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers, ABA
BANKING J. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/04/sec-proposes-best-interest-regulationsfor-broker-dealers-investment-advisers/#_ga=2.106055875.1129312188.1537201265-2028325836.15361801
71.
19
John Iekel, U.S. Retirement Assets Grow in 3rd Quarter, ASPPA (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://www.asppa.org/news/browse-topics/us-retirement-assets-grow-3rd-quarter (adding together the reported
value of assets for IRAs, defined-contribution plans, and private defined-benefit plans as of September 2017).
20
SEC, AGENCY AND MISSION INFORMATION 4 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/sec-fy2017agency-mission-information.pdf.
21
Compare Ira D. Hammerman, Lecture, SEC–Don’t Throw Away Your Shot! A Renewed Call for a
Uniform Fiduciary Standard to Protect Individual Investors, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 310, 319–20 (2017)
(arguing against the DOL’s fiduciary rule and in favor of the SEC exercising its authority under Section 913 of
Dodd-Frank), and Polina Demina, Note, Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: A Behavioral-Economics
Analysis of Competing Suggestions for Reform, 113 MICH. L. REV. 429, 459 (2014) (relying on a behavioraleconomics analysis to argue that the SEC should adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and
investment advisers), with Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 395 (2010) (“[I]mposing fiduciary duties on brokers is incompatible with their
historical roles as dealers and underwriters.”), and Ross Jordan, Note, Thinking Before Rulemaking: Why the
SEC Should Think Twice Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 492–93 (2012) (arguing that it would yield little benefit for the SEC to
apply the fiduciary standards under Capital Gains to broker-dealers).
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This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys the origins and
development of federal securities law and the current legislation and regulation
governing both broker-dealers and investment advisers. It explains how the
evolution of securities regulation and financial markets has resulted in a
convergence in authority to regulate broker-dealers and investment advisers
between the SEC and DOL. It also explains how the DOL’s fiduciary rule
encroached on and conflicted with the SEC’s existing authority and policy,
creating a divergence in policy until the fiduciary rule was struck down. Part II
then identifies the primary problems stemming from the resultant, stilldisjointed regulatory framework, including losses suffered by investors, investor
confusion, and rising compliance costs for financial service providers.
Finally, Part III observes that changes in the investment world in recent
decades necessitate a uniform legislative and regulatory response to resolve the
issues stemming from the agencies’ growing overlap in authority to regulate
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Given the likelihood of congressional
inaction, though, this Part argues for the SEC and DOL to jointly develop an
interagency solution to harmonize the administration and enforcement of a
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers who provide personalized
investment advice to investors.
To effectuate this change, Part III advances two arguments. First, it argues
that the SEC should exercise its authority under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) to elevate all
broker-dealers who provide personalized investment advice to fiduciary status.
Before the SEC implements its own standard, though, the SEC and DOL should
first coordinate their efforts. Second, in conjunction with the SEC implementing
a uniform fiduciary standard, it argues that the SEC and DOL should publish
interagency guidelines to (1) clarify when broker-dealer services implicate
fiduciary status and how broker-dealers can avoid fiduciary responsibility and
(2) avoid duplicative enforcement mechanisms. If adopted, these proposals
would help mitigate the problems stemming from the current regulatory
framework and put investors’ interests first, in keeping with the SEC’s mandate.
I.

OVERLAP AND DIVERGENCE: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS

The distinction between the services offered by broker-dealers and
investment advisers, two types of financial service providers, has become
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increasingly blurred over the past three decades.22 By definition, a “brokerdealer” is any person (individual or entity) who executes securities transactions
for the account of others and engages in the purchase and sale of securities on
such person’s own account.23 On the other hand, an “investment adviser” is any
person that is compensated for providing advice relating to the value,
investment, purchase, or sale of securities to investors.24 This Part seeks to
explain why the services offered by these two types of financial service
providers has become so difficult to distinguish. It first provides a brief history
of federal securities legislation and regulation and an overview of the current
framework governing broker-dealers and investment advisers. It then highlights
that, while the SEC and DOL both exist in part to protect investors, their
authority and policies to do so differ in meaningful ways.
Notably, this Part reviews the creation and current state of a complex, twotiered regulatory framework that imposes different standards of conduct on
similar actions to the detriment of investors. Section A describes the
development of federal securities regulation and the creation of the SEC as the
original—and still primary—securities regulator.25 It explains how, in 2010,
Congress amended its earlier legislation to provide the SEC with increased
authority to impose stringent standards of conduct on broker-dealers who
provide personalized investment advice to retirement investors. Section A also
identifies how the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a selfregulatory organization (SRO), operates under SEC oversight. Finally, section
B examines how the DOL’s authority to regulate broker-dealers and investment
advisers working with retirement investors encroaches on the SEC’s authority
to regulate all broker-dealers and investment advisers.
A The Securities and Exchange Commission
As the primary regulator of federal securities markets,26 the SEC is
authorized to regulate broker-dealers and investment advisers.27 Despite its

22

Laby, supra note 21, at 398.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A), (a)(5)(A) (2012).
24
Michael
Knes,
Investment
Advisers
Act
of
1940,
REFERENCE
FOR
BUS.,
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Int-Jun/Investment-Advisers-Act-of-1940.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2018) (“Whether . . . a person is . . . an investment adviser under the [Investment Advisers Act]
generally depends on three criteria: the type of advice offered, the method of compensation, and whether or not
a significant portion of the ‘adviser’s’ income comes from proffering investment advice.”).
25
Krug, supra note 16, at 340.
26
Id.
27
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012).
23
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authority, the SEC has failed to satisfy its mission—to protect investors—by not
promulgating a fiduciary rule to prevent broker-dealers from providing
conflicted investment advice to their customers.28 Even so, the agency remains
best suited to impose industry-wide standards regulating broker-dealers and
investment advisers.
To help illustrate this point, this section begins with a brief history of federal
securities regulation. It then discusses the evolution of the SEC’s authority to
regulate broker-dealers and investment advisers due to changes in legislation
over the past eighty years; it places emphasis on Section 913 of Dodd-Frank,
which allows the SEC to impose fiduciary obligations on broker-dealers who
provide personalized investment advice to investors.29 It concludes by
describing how the SEC administers and enforces its current regulation of
broker-dealers and investment advisers.
1. The Development of Federal Securities Regulation and the Creation of
the SEC
The stock market crash of October 1929 precipitated the longest
recessionary period in the United States since the 1880s.30 Prior to the crash,
“there was little support for federal regulation of the securities markets.”31
However, after the crash, when investor confidence plummeted and the need for
securities regulation became evident,32 Congress enacted comprehensive
securities legislation to restore the public’s faith in capital markets, spur
economic recovery, and protect investors’ interests.33
The comprehensive securities legislation that was enacted in the years
following the stock market crash of October 1929 governed any offer, sale, or
trade of securities.34 Namely, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933

28
See generally John A. Turner, The Pension Mis-Selling Scandal, the SEC, and the Fiduciary Standard,
23 CONN. INS. L.J. 263 (2016) (comparing pension mis-selling scandals in the United Kingdom and United States
and concluding that the SEC’s fiduciary standard is weak).
29
SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS i–ii (2011) [hereinafter SEC 913
Study], https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
30
U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/
cycles.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
31
What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html#org (last visited Oct. 20, 2018); see
also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 348, 348 (1991)
(explaining that states were responsible for regulating the sale of securities prior to the crash).
32
See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, AMERICAN BUSINESS SINCE 1920, at 60 (2009) (explaining that the number
of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange in 1932 was approximately one-third the 1929 figure).
33
What We Do, supra note 31.
34
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
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(Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to help
restore the public’s faith in capital markets.35 These Acts accomplished two
primary goals. First, they required all publicly-traded companies to disclose
truthful information about their businesses and the character of their securities.36
Second, they established that “[p]eople who sell and trade securities . . . must
treat investors fairly and honestly, [by] putting investors’ interests first.”37
Together, these requirements fostered an investment landscape focused on
guaranteeing that all investors are privy to the same information and can rely on
fair and honest treatment in the execution of their investments.
Under the Exchange Act, Congress established the SEC, a federal agency
and
non-partisan
commission
“to
be
composed
of
five
commissioners . . . appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”38 The SEC’s founding mandate was to create securitiesrelated rules and regulations that would protect investors, regardless of their
purpose for investing.39 This included the authority to regulate broker-dealers,
national securities exchanges, and registration requirements for securities.40 In
1940, Congress further defined the SEC’s authority to regulate financial markets
by enacting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.41 While the Investment
Advisers Act defined investment adviser, it did not modify the SEC’s mandate,
which was—and remains42—to protect investors, nor did it expressly establish
a required standard of conduct for broker-dealers or investment advisers.43
Instead, until 2010 when Congress passed Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, the SEC
was limited in its ability to modify the standard of conduct that broker-dealers
were required to satisfy.44

35

What We Do, supra note 31.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(4) (2012).
37
What We Do, supra note 31.
38
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (“Not more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same
political party, and in making appointments members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately
as nearly as may be practicable.”).
39
What We Do, supra note 31.
40
15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o(a)–(b) (2012).
41
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1–b-21 (2012).
42
Under its current mandate, the SEC is responsible for protecting investors and facilitating efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012).
43
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(3), (7), (11) (2012) (defining “broker,” “dealer,” and “investment adviser”
without including a standard of conduct therein for each).
44
See infra Section I.A.2. (explaining that the SEC was granted the authority to elevate broker-dealers
who provide personalized investment advice to fiduciary status in 2010).
36
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2. The SEC’s Authority to Impose Fiduciary Obligations
By enacting the Investment Advisers Act, Congress achieved three
outcomes: defining “investment adviser,” establishing that investment advisers
must operate as fiduciaries on behalf of their clients, and limiting the SEC’s
authority to define broker-dealers’ fiduciary obligations, though the latter two
outcomes were not evident until courts later held as much.45 Motivated by the
financial crash of 2008, under Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, Congress amended
the Investment Advisers Act in 2010 to grant the SEC broader, yet still limited,
authority to impose fiduciary obligations on broker-dealers who provide
personalized investment advice to their customers.46 However, the SEC has not
yet exercised that authority.
Under the SEC’s current regulatory framework, broker-dealers typically do
not qualify as investment advisers and thus are not required to adhere to a
fiduciary standard of conduct when acting on behalf of their customers.47
Consequently, broker-dealers do not need to act in their customers’ best interests
and are not prevented from providing investment advice where a conflict of
interest may exist.48
The Investment Advisers Act broadly defines “investment adviser” as
follows:
[A]ny person49 who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities50 or as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and
as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities . . . .51
45
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963)
(explaining that the “Investment Advisers Act . . . reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship”); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(vacating a rule promulgated by the SEC that sought to exempt certain broker-dealers from the Investment
Advisers Act).
46
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012).
47
FINRA Manual, supra note 6 (stating that broker-dealers must have a “reasonable basis” to believe that
their recommendations are suitable for their customers).
48
In other words, a broker-dealer may make recommendations that are suitable to a customer’s needs,
but not in a customer’s best interest.
49
“‘Person’ means a natural person or a company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(16).
50
As defined in the Investment Advisers Act, “‘security’ means any note, stock [common or preferred],
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, [or] evidence of indebtedness,” among other interests. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(18).
51
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (footnotes added).
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Interpreting this language alone, it would appear that a person’s title would not
dictate whether a person qualifies as an investment adviser. However, the
Investment Advisers Act carves out an exception by categorically excluding
persons registered as broker-dealers from the definition of “investment adviser”
so long as they satisfy a two-part conjunctive test.52
Under the two-part test, broker-dealers are not considered investment
advisers if: (1) performance of their services “is solely incidental to the conduct
of [their] business as a broker or dealer”;53 and (2) they receive no “special
compensation” for that business.54 When considered together, these factors
mean that a broker-dealer may provide investment advisory services that are
incidental to its primary business, so long as it only earns brokerage
commissions, without being considered an investment adviser.55 Consequently,
this two-part test enables broker-dealers to avoid qualifying as an “investment
adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act. By excluding broker-dealers from
the definition of “investment adviser,” Congress created a two-tier framework,
with one set of standards governing broker-dealers and another governing
investment advisers.
This framework is meaningful because broker-dealers need only adhere to
the less exacting suitability standard when acting on behalf of their customers,
while investment advisers must adhere to a fiduciary standard of conduct when
doing so. Although the Investment Advisers Act does not expressly impose a
fiduciary standard on investment advisers, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Investment Advisers Act as implicitly establishing such a standard in 1963.56 In
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Court explained that “[t]he
Investment Advisers Act . . . reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship.”57 Thus, any person who

52

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
Id. As used in the first prong of this test, a “broker” is “any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others,” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012), and a “dealer” is “any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a
broker or otherwise.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
54
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). As used in the second prong of this test, “special compensation” means
non-commission-based compensation. See Laby, supra note 21, at 403. Broker-dealers typically earn
commissions, whereas, investment advisers typically earn fees on the amount of assets under management. Id.
at 395. The former incentivizes trade activity, whether good or bad, and the latter incentivizes maximizing
returns on investments.
55
Knes, supra note 24.
56
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
57
Id.
53
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satisfies the definition of investment adviser must adhere to fiduciary standards
of conduct.58
To satisfy fiduciary standards, an investment adviser must satisfy “an
affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material
facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable care to avoid
misleading his clients,” or it will be subject to civil liability.59 The first
requirement, the duty of good faith, requires fiduciaries to act in their clients’
best interest;60 whereas, the second requirement, the duty of care, requires
fiduciaries to seek the best execution in securities transactions executed for their
clients.61 Together, these requirements demand investment advisers to act in
their clients’ best interest when rendering investment advice.
Until 2010, the SEC did not have the authority to modify the definition of
“broker” or “dealer” as defined in the Investment Advisers Act—either to
broaden or narrow the scope of those definitions.62 Its lack of authority was
evidenced by its failed efforts to expand those definitions nearly two decades
ago. In 1999, the SEC proposed a rule aimed at broadening the scope of brokers
and dealers exempt from fiduciary status.63 After facing backlash from
investment advisers who argued that the proposal would unduly benefit brokerdealers by enabling them to provide investment advice without serving as
fiduciaries, “[t]he SEC did not act on the proposal for nearly five years.”64
However, it “reopened the comment period . . . in January 2005” and adopted a
substantially similar re-proposal in April 2005.65
In response to the rule’s adoption, the Financial Planning Association66
petitioned for judicial review, challenging the SEC’s authority to modify the
conditions under which a broker or dealer could be excluded from the definition
of investment adviser.67 In March 2007, the D.C. Circuit applied the two-step
analysis under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
58

Id.
Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
60
Jordan, supra note 21, at 502–03.
61
Id. at 510.
62
Laby, supra note 21, at 411.
63
Id. at 408 (“The proposed rule was designed to prevent application of the [Investment Advisers] Act to
broker-dealers solely because they repriced full service brokerage to a fee-based structure or established a twotier system of pricing, one for full-service brokerage and one for execution-only or discount brokerage.”).
64
Id. at 409.
65
Id. 409–10.
66
“The Financial Planning Association [is] an advocacy group for persons who provide and receive
financial planning services . . . .” Id. at 409.
67
Id.
59
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holding that the SEC did not have the authority to rewrite the terms of the
statutory exclusion in the Investment Advisers Act because the text of the
exception was unambiguous.68 A few months later, as Professor Arthur B. Laby
described, “the SEC announced it would stand down.”69
By standing down, the SEC implicitly acknowledged that it did not have the
authority to modify the definition of broker or dealer under existing legislation.
This left in place the existing two-tiered structure governing investment advisers
and broker-dealers. So, unlike investment advisers, who must adhere to fiduciary
standards under the Investment Advisers Act,70 broker-dealers needed (and still
need) to comply only with general anti-fraud provisions,71 including the
suitability standard.72
This all changed in 2010 when Congress expanded the SEC’s authority to
regulate broker-dealers by passing Section 913 of Dodd-Frank.73 Section 913
amended the Securities Exchange Act to enable the SEC to impose the same
fiduciary standard of conduct that applies to investment advisers to brokerdealers who provide personalized investment advice to their customers.74 Not
only that, Congress required the SEC to conduct a study evaluating “the
effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care” for broker-dealers
and investment advisers.75 In the corresponding study that was conducted by a
task force within the SEC and published in January 2011, the task force
recommended that the SEC exercise its new authority under Section 913 by
imposing a higher standard of conduct on broker-dealers who provide
personalized investment advice.76
But despite having the authority to impose fiduciary obligations on brokerdealers who provide personalized investment advice and a recommendation
68

Id. at 411.
Id.
70
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
71
Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/
divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html#V (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (listing other requirements, including, but
not limited to, the duty of fair dealing, duty of best execution, and the customer confirmation rule).
72
Compare id. (stating that the suitability standard requires that broker-dealers “recommend only those
specific investments or overall investment strategies that are suitable for their customers”), with Capital Gains,
375 U.S. at 194 (stating that an investment adviser acting as a fiduciary must satisfy “an affirmative duty of
utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to employ
reasonable care to avoid misleading . . . clients”).
73
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat.
1376, 1824 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o(k)(1) (2012)).
74
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1).
75
§ 913(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1824.
76
SEC 913 STUDY, supra note 29, at vi.
69
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from a task force within the SEC to exercise that authority, the SEC has not yet
done so. The two-tiered structure for broker-dealers and investment advisers
remains in place. While the SEC is making progress towards promulgating a
new standard of conduct for broker-dealers, the specifics of that new standard
are unclear.77 In April 2018, a month after the Fifth Circuit vacated the DOL’s
fiduciary rule, the Commission proposed two new regulations and an
interpretation by a 4-to-1 vote.78 The stated goal of these proposals, one of which
is called Regulation Best Interest, is to increase disclosure requirements and
mitigate conflicts of interest that arise from broker-dealer services.79 The
comment period for these proposals closed in early August 2018, and the SEC
is currently considering the comments as it drafts what is likely to become the
new standard for broker-dealers who provide investment advisory services.80
Until a final rule is adopted, though, it will be hard to predict what the SEC will
do. As such, the next section provides an overview of the SEC’s existing
apparatus for administering and enforcing its two-tiered framework.
3. Enforcement by the SEC
To support the SEC’s mandate, Congress initially granted the SEC the
authority “to appoint . . . such officers . . . and other experts as may be necessary
to carry out [the Commission’s] functions under” the Exchange Act.81 In
addition, the SEC is now responsible for enforcing the Investment Advisers Act,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Dodd-Frank, and the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act.82
Two of the SEC’s five divisions, the Divisions of Investment Management
and the Division of Enforcement, are primarily responsible for assisting the
Commission in enforcing the aforementioned securities legislation and related
regulation.83 The Division of Investment Management assists “the Commission
in enforcement matters involving investment companies and advisers,” and the

77

See Clayton, supra note 17.
Ed Beeson, SEC Unveils Plans for “Best Interest” Standard for Brokers, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2018, 9:40
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1034840/sec-unveils-plans-for-best-interest-standard-for-brokers.
79
Id. Although the name “Regulation Best Interest” suggests that the proposal would effectuate a
fiduciary standard of care, which would require broker-dealers to act in their customers’ best interest, multiple
Commissioners say the new proposals merely tweak the existing suitability standard. Id.
80
Id.; see Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,574, 21,681 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
81
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4(b), 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934) (current version codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1) (2012)).
82
What We Do, supra note 31.
83
15 U.S.C. § 78d(h)(2); What We Do, supra note 31.
78
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Division of Enforcement makes recommendations to the Commission about
whether it should “bring civil actions in federal court or as administrative
proceedings before an administrative law judge.”84 The Division of Enforcement
also prosecutes cases on the Commission’s behalf against broker-dealers and
investment advisers who violate their respective standards of conduct.85 Thus,
when broker-dealers or investment advisers fail to adhere to suitability standards
or fiduciary obligations, respectively, then such persons will be subject to civil
liability and sanctions enforced by the SEC.
4. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
In addition to being subject to the SEC’s direct regulatory authority, brokerdealers are also subject to FINRA’s regulatory authority under SEC oversight.86
This section discusses how FINRA operates under SEC oversight and how its
mandate, authority to regulate broker-dealers, and enforcement procedures
overlap with the SEC’s. Particularly, it highlights how FINRA Rule 2111,
regarding the suitability of broker-dealer recommendations, is administered and
enforced by FINRA. It also briefly discusses the history and mission of FINRA’s
predecessor, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
The Maloney Act of 1938 amended the Exchange Act to authorize the SEC
“to register voluntary national associations of broker[-]dealers” that regulate
themselves while operating under SEC oversight.87 One year after Congress
passed the Maloney Act, securities industry representatives created NASD, an
SRO that regulated broker-dealers.88 “NASD’s founding mandate was . . . to
advance just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors,”
and was later charged with promoting capital formation and regulating fair and
efficient securities markets.89 In 2007, the SEC approved the merger of NASD
and the NYSE’s member regulation to form FINRA.90

84

What We Do, supra note 31.
Id.
86
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. i (1997),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p009762.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2018); see infra note 90
and accompanying text.
87
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 86.
88
Id.; Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Marks 75th Anniversary of Protecting Investors (Sept. 18, 2014).
89
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 86 (“The NASD, taking direction from the SEC in 1963,
has also adopted, as another tenet of its self-regulatory mandate, the promotion of capital formation by
developing, operating, and regulating fair and efficient . . . securities markets.”).
90
Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007).
85
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FINRA exists to protect investors and strengthen market integrity through
regulation of its registered members,91 which includes regulation of “[e]very
firm and broker that sells securities to the public in the United States.”92 Firms
and brokers are required by legislation to register with FINRA.93 Consequently,
FINRA currently regulates approximately 3,700 brokerage firms and nearly
630,000 registered brokers under SEC oversight.94
This regulatory authority includes the power to establish standards of
conduct that member broker-dealers must adhere to when operating on behalf of
their clients.95 One key area of regulatory overlap between FINRA and the SEC
is Rule 2111.96 Under Rule 2111, a broker-dealer can only recommend a
transaction or investment strategy if it has “a reasonable basis to believe that a
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer.”97 This means that a broker-dealer must
select within a range of suitable investment options based on, for example, the
client’s age, investment objectives, and risk tolerance.98 Thus, a broker-dealer is
not required to act in its customers’ best interests,99 nor is it required to obtain
its customers’ written consent before principal trading—that is, buying or selling
stocks on its own behalf.100 Both of which are required for investment
advisers.101
Although multiple departments within FINRA collaborate to enforce Rule
2111, its Enforcement Department is primarily responsible for bringing
disciplinary actions.102 These actions include fines, suspensions, or even barring
broker-dealers from the industry when they commit egregious violations.103 The
disciplinary actions are resolved by the Enforcement Department either settling
91
92

Id.
Member Regulation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/member-regulation (last visited Oct. 20,

2018).
93

Id.
About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
95
Rules and Guidance, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/rules-and-guidance (last visited Oct. 20,
2018). FINRA’s standards do not limit the SEC’s powers or duties. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(c) (2012).
96
See supra note 72; see also FINRA Manual: Contents: Rule 2310, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638NASD (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (“This rule is no
longer applicable. NASD Rule 2310 has been superseded by FINRA Rule 2111.”).
97
FINRA Manual, supra note 6.
98
Id.
99
Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–94 (1963) (discussing
investment advisers’ fiduciary obligations), with FINRA Manual, supra note 6 (defining the suitability standard).
100
Jordan, supra note 21, at 503.
101
Id.
102
Enforcement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
103
Id.
94
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with offending broker-dealers or filing a formal complaint with FINRA’s Office
of Hearing Officers, an office of impartial adjudicators, for its determination.104
Either way, the notable difference between enforcement by FINRA versus that
of the SEC is less about policy or procedural differences than it is about funding.
FINRA is a profitable, self-funded SRO; whereas, the SEC relies on government
funding.105 Despite their similarities, however, the SEC’s and FINRA’s policies
and procedures remain at odds with the DOL’s attempted regulatory efforts.
B. The Department of Labor
In addition to the SEC and FINRA, the DOL also has regulatory authority
over broker-dealers when they provide investment advice to pension plans or
other retirement accounts. This authority, or any authority the DOL has to
regulate financial service providers for that matter, derives from ERISA,106
which was enacted in response to a crisis in the early 1970s involving
widespread private-sector pension plan failures, and is the most comprehensive
legislation governing private-sector pension plans to date.107
This section begins by providing a brief history of retirement investing and
retirement investment legislation leading to ERISA in 1974 as a foundation for
later comparison of the SEC and DOL’s convergence in authority and recent
divergence in regulatory policy. Primarily, it focuses on the fact that total
retirement assets in the United States amounted to around $369 billion when
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.108 But by 2018, that number grew nearly 77
times, totaling approximately $28.3 trillion in retirement assets in the United
States.109 Concurrently, the proportion of private-sector defined-benefit plans to
total retirement assets declined significantly, and the proportion of definedcontribution plans and IRAs, which look more like non-retirement investments

104

Id.; Office of Hearing Officers, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/oho (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
FINRA, FINRA 2018 ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY 4 (2018).
106
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(current version codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
107
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF
THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974, at 1580, 1635 (Comm. Print 1974); AON HEWITT, CHRONOLOGICAL
SUMMARY OF MAJOR POST-ERISA BENEFIT LEGISLATION (2012), http://www.aon.com/attachments/humancapital-consulting/summary_of_major_post-erisa_legislation_07.2012.pdf; see also PENSIONS: THE BROKEN
PROMISE (NBC News 1972).
108
Retirement Assets Total $28.3 Trillion in Second Quarter 2018, INV. CO. INST., https://www.ici.org/
research/stats/retirement/ret_18_q2 (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (relying on the data in Table 1 of “The U.S.
Retirement Market, Second Quarter 2018” spreadsheet available on the page cited).
109
Id.
105
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than defined-benefit plans, grew significantly.110 This section then discusses the
DOL’s regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers since 1974, with an
eye toward comparing its regulation to that of the SEC. Finally, this section
concludes with a review of how the DOL administers and enforces ERISA and
its regulations.
1. The Development of Retirement Investment Regulation Prior to ERISA
There was not a great need for regulation of retirement investing in the first
half of the twentieth century. The average age of retirement was seventy in
1940,111 but the average life expectancy was sixty-four.112 With the average age
of retirement surpassing the average life expectancy, it is unsurprising that only
15% of all private-sector employees were covered by a pension plan in 1940.113
By 1970, though, the average age of retirement dropped to sixty-five114 and the
average life expectancy rose to over seventy.115 This inversion, along with
legislation that provided tax benefits for pension trusts,116 likely led to the huge
growth in the number of private-sector employees covered by pension plans,
with approximately 45% of all private-sector employees covered by these plans
in 1970.117
Despite the growth in popularity of pension plans between 1940 and 1970,
Congress failed to enact legislation that would prevent pension plan sponsors,
namely employers, from mismanaging the benefits they guaranteed to their
beneficiaries, namely employees.118 Instead, Congress introduced piecemeal
legislation to regulate how plan sponsors must fulfill their pension promises.119
Congress enacted legislation in 1947 to create guidelines for “the establishment
and operation of pension plans administered jointly by an employer and a
union.”120 Eleven years later, in 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension
110
Id. (showing that private-sector defined-benefit plans declined from 35% of all retirement assets in
1974 to just under 11% in 2018).
111
The Average Retirement Age in the United States from 1900 to 2010, STATISTA, https://www.statista.
com/statistics/319983/average-retirement-age-in-the-us/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
112
Elizabeth Arias, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, United States Life Tables, 2003, 54 Nat’l Vital
Stat. Rep. 1, 30 (2006).
113
History of Pension Plans, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., https://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.
cfm?fa=0398afact (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
114
The Average Retirement Age in the United States from 1900 to 2010, supra note 111.
115
Arias, supra note 112.
116
History of Pension Plans, supra note 113.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. (describing legislative changes passed concerning pension plans).
120
Id. (also known as the Taft-Hartley Act).
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Plans Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act), which required plan sponsors to provide
plan beneficiaries the necessary information to “monitor their plans to prevent
mismanagement and abuse of plan funds”121 by disclosing pension plan-related
information, including plan descriptions and annual financial reports.122 And in
1962, just four years after placing the burden on beneficiaries to monitor their
plans, Congress shifted plan oversight responsibility to the DOL by amending
the Disclosure Act to grant the Secretary of Labor “enforcement, interpretative,
and investigatory powers over employee benefit plans to prevent
mismanagement and abuse of plan funds.”123 Even after this shift, however,
disclosure requirements proved to be an inadequate means of preventing pension
plan mismanagement.
The flood of pension fund failures in the 1960s and early 1970s illustrates
just how futile these legislative acts were in preventing private pension plan
mismanagement.124 Perhaps the best known example of pension plan failure
involves the Studebaker Corporation, a wagon and automobile manufacturer
located in South Bend, Indiana.125 When it closed its plant in 1963, more than
6,000 employees lost their jobs,126 and over 4,500 of them lost 85% of their
vested benefits because Studebaker failed to maintain sufficient funds to pay
their pension plan liabilities.127 But this was not an isolated incident.128 The
problem was pervasive and continued into the 1970s. Over 19,000 workers lost
121
History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/aboutebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
122
Comment, The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 59, 65 (1958); see also
History of Pension Plans, supra note 113.
123
History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 121 (granting the Secretary of Labor the authority to regulate
pension plans for the first time). In March 1962, President Kennedy also commissioned a committee to “conduct
a review of . . . the role and character of the private pension and other retirement systems in the economic security
system of the Nation.” PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE RET. & WELFARE
PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS 39 (1965).
124
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF
THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974, at 1619, 1653 (Comm. Print 1974).
125
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374 n.22 (1980).
126
Kelli Stopczynski, Remembering Studebaker 50 Years Later, WSBT (Dec. 9, 2013), http://wsbt.com/
news/local/remembering-studebaker-50-years-later.
127
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF
THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974, at 1599 (Comm. Print 1974).
128
Id. Another well-known example of pension plan failure resulted from the sale of P. Ballantine and
Sons, an American brewery and “substantial contributor to a multiemployer plan.” Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at
374 n.22. The sale of the brewery in 1972 resulted in the shutdown of a plant that employed nearly 2,000
employees. Ronald Sullivan, Newark Losing Ballantine Plant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 1972), http://www.nytimes.
com/1972/03/04/archives/brewery-is-sold-to-falstaff-which-will-keep-brand-ballantine-sold.html. As part of
the sale, P. Ballantine and Sons withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan, resulting in “several hundred
employees, with as many as 30 years [of] service, [losing] a substantial portion of their vested benefits.”
Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at 374 n.22.
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an average of more than $4,000 due to unexpected pension plan termination in
1972 alone.129 Having seen enough by 1974, Congress enacted ERISA,130 the
most comprehensive pension legislation to date, to address the crisis stemming
from private pension plan mismanagement.131
2. The DOL’s Authority to Impose Fiduciary Obligations
Congress enacted ERISA to protect pension plan beneficiaries without
discouraging employers from maintaining or creating pension plan offerings.132
Title I of ERISA governs the management of voluntarily established pension
plans in private industry, including defined-benefit and defined-contribution
plans.133 But it does not apply to state- or federally-sponsored pension plans,134
nor does it require private-sector employers or employees to create pension
plans.135 It instead establishes standards for employers and employees that do.136
Title II of ERISA substantively reflects Title I, but it governs IRAs, not pension
plans.137 The following sections proceed by further detailing ERISA’s scope.
a. An Overview of the Retirement Accounts Regulated Under ERISA
This section provides a brief comparison of the three types of retirement
investments that this Comment discusses—defined-benefit plans, definedcontribution plans, and traditional IRAs—and non-retirement investment
accounts. Defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans are retirement
accounts that are typically created and maintained by employers for the benefit
of their employees.138 In a defined-benefit plan, an employer guarantees its

129

SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF
1872–73 (Comm. Print 1974).
130
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (current
version codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
131
See AON Hewitt, supra note 107, at 1.
132
Britni A. Summers, Comment, Called to the Principal’s Office: How Principal Would Have Been Held
Accountable in McCaffree v. Principal Under the New ERISA Fiduciary Standard, 62 S.D. L. REV. 183, 189
(2017).
133
ERISA also governs the management of health benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012), but those are
not the focus of this Comment.
134
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012).
135
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (stating that ERISA covers a pension plan “if it is established or maintained”).
136
Id.
137
See I.R.C. § 4975 (2012); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 162 (N.D.
Tex. 2017).
138
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2012).
THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974, at

KUBIAKPROOFS2

2018]

1/14/2019 2:43 PM

OFF-KEY REGULATION

389

employee “a fixed, pre-established benefit . . . at retirement”;139 whereas, in a
defined-contribution plan, an employer only guarantees an employee a defined
contribution for the account today, not a fixed benefit at retirement.140 With
defined-contribution plans, the benefit depends on “the amount saved and the
investment returns net of fees on those assets.”141 Unlike both defined-benefit
and defined-contribution plans, however, traditional IRAs are created and
maintained by individuals outside of their employment.142
Defined-benefit plans, defined-contribution plans, and traditional IRAs are
different from non-retirement investment accounts in two keys ways. First, all
contributions to pension plans and traditional IRAs are tax-advantaged.143 That
is, the IRS collects taxes on the funds when retirees make withdrawals, rather
than taxing contributions when invested during employment.144 Generally,
deferred compensation retirement accounts are beneficial for investors because
they allow investors to accumulate capital gains free of taxation until the funds
are drawn down during retirement, when investors are typically taxed at a lower
rate.145 Second, there are annual limitations on the amount of contributions
employees and individuals can make to their plans and accounts, respectively.146
Although defined-benefit plans, defined-contributions plans, and traditional
IRAs are similar in the two respects mentioned above, they are in different in
one key way: risk allocation—specifically, the risk related to fluctuations in
pricing in invested capital due to market movements. For defined-benefit plans,
plan sponsors bear the risk of ensuring that employees receive a fixed amount of
funds at retirement.147 Fluctuations can be good or bad for employers. If the
return on invested contributions is higher than forecasted, then the pension plan

139
Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/
choosing-a-retirement-plan-defined-benefit-plan (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). Contributions are commonly based
on several factors, including “age, earnings, and tenure.” COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 4.
140
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 4.
141
Id.
142
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 408(a) (2012).
143
Taxation of Retirement Income, FINRA, www.finra.org/investors/taxation-retirement-income (last
visited Oct. 20, 2018).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See Retirement Topics – Contributions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participantemployee/retirement-topics-contributions (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
147
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 4. This means that plan sponsors are responsible for
investing enough funds to ensure its plan’s assets (investments) equal its plan’s liabilities (benefits promised),
which is an inherently risky task given the unpredictability of market fluctuations.
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will be overfunded.148 If the return on invested contributions is lower than
forecasted, however, then plan sponsors will be required to contribute additional
funds to the plan.149 In contrast, employees and individuals bear the risk of loss
on invested contributions for defined-contribution plans and IRAs, respectively,
but yield the gains from overperformance.150
b. Who Qualifies as a Fiduciary Under ERISA
The definition of “fiduciary” in Title I of ERISA more broadly elevates
persons to the status of fiduciary than does the definition of investment adviser
in the Investment Advisers Act.151 Title I states:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a[n employee pension benefit]
plan to the extent . . . he renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so.152

In other words, an individual or entity must adhere to a fiduciary standard of
conduct when acting on behalf of their client if the individual or entity receives
compensation for “rendering investment advice.” Before discussing the DOL’s
interpretation of “rendering investment advice” momentarily, it is useful to
compare the definition of fiduciary under ERISA to the one set forth in Capital
Gains (and enforced by the SEC).
Under Title I of ERISA, which governs the administration and enforcement
of pension plans, including defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans, a
fiduciary must satisfy two different standards of conduct—one standard is
principles-based and the other is rules-based.153 The principles-based standard
is the prudent man standard of care,154 which is similar to the fiduciary standard
148
Id.; see also How Do Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans Become Overfunded?, QBI,
http://qbillc.com/blog/how-do-defined-benefit-and-cash-balance-plans-become-over-funded (last visited Oct.
20, 2018) (discussing the problems associated with overfunded defined-benefit pension plans).
149
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 4.
150
Id.
151
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012) (explaining that qualifying persons—regardless of whether
they are a broker-dealer—are considered fiduciaries under ERISA if they meet certain conditions), with 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012) (excluding broker-dealers from the definition of investment adviser, thereby
exempting them from fiduciary status).
152
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added).
153
29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1106(a) (2012); see also STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 54 (10th ed. 2015) (discussing the concepts of fiduciary duty that apply to legal
and other professionals).
154
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (defining the prudent man standard of care), with SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–94 (1963) (discussing investment advisers’ fiduciary
obligations).
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imposed on investment advisers under Capital Gains.155 It establishes that a
fiduciary must
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the . . . beneficiaries . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence . . . that a prudent man acting a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.156

Alternatively, the rules-based standard restricts a fiduciary from entering
into specified prohibited transactions.157 Among other restrictions, fiduciaries
are also prohibited from “receiv[ing] any consideration for [their] own personal
account from any party dealing with [a] plan in connection with a transaction
involving the assets of the plan.”158 If a fiduciary fails to comply with either of
these standards, the individual or entity will be subject to civil liability
enforceable by the Secretary of Labor or a pension plan participant or
beneficiary, all of whom have standing under Title I.159
In addition to giving the DOL the authority to interpret whether a person is
fiduciary under Title I (and thus subject to the stringent standards of conduct
mentioned above), Congress authorized the DOL to grant conditional or
unconditional exemptions from the prohibited transactions (and thus the
authority to grant exemptions from fiduciary status), so long as the Secretary of
Labor “finds that such exemption is[] (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the
interests of the plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and (3) protective
of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan.”160 If the DOL grants
an exemption, a fiduciary may act in an otherwise prohibited manner without
concern for civil or criminal liability under Title I.161
Title II, which governs the administration and enforcement of IRAs,
provides an identical definition of “fiduciary” and list of prohibited transactions
as Title I.162 It varies from Title I, however, in two meaningful ways. First, “Title
II . . . does not expressly impose the duties of loyalty and prudence on

155

See Section I.A.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
157
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (including sales or exchanges, loans, and transfers, among others).
158
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).
159
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2012).
160
29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (2012).
161
Id.
162
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)–(2), (e)(3)(B) (2012); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp.
3d 152, 162 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
156
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fiduciaries.”163 Second, it does not grant IRA beneficiaries the right to file a civil
action against fiduciaries who fail to satisfy the appropriate standards of conduct
described above.164 Instead, under Title II, Congress subjected an offending
fiduciary to a 15% tax on each prohibited transaction.165
c. Regulation by the DOL After ERISA
In 1975, the DOL issued a regulation defining “renders investment advice”
in the definition of “fiduciary.”166 The regulation established the following fivepart conjunctive test for determining whether a person “renders investment
advice,” and thereby invokes fiduciary status:
(1) [A] person renders advice as to the value of securities or other
property . . . , (2) [o]n a regular basis, (3) [p]ursuant to a mutual
agreement . . . with the plan or plan fiduciary, (4) [t]he advice will
serve as the primary basis for investment decisions with respect to
plan assets, and (5) [t]he advice will be individualized based on the
particular needs of the plan.167
By not satisfying any one of these elements, broker-dealers are able to
circumvent fiduciary responsibility under ERISA despite rendering what looks
like investment advice.
The circumvention of fiduciary status by broker-dealers has become more
common due to the increased popularity of rollovers—transferring retirement
assets from a pension plan to an IRA upon switching careers or retiring—which
enable broker-dealers to provide one-time investment advice and avoid
providing advice on a regular basis.168 In fact, “rollovers are expected to
approach $2.4 trillion cumulatively from 2016 to 2020.”169 Consequently, under
the 1975 regulation, broker-dealers regularly “have no obligation to adhere to
ERISA’s fiduciary standards or to the prohibited transactions rules,”170 “even

163

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 231 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
I.R.C. § 4975(a).
165
Id.
166
Definitions of Terms Used in Subchapters C, D, E, F, and G of this Chapter, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,842 (Oct.
24, 1975) (defining the term “fiduciary”).
167
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 231 F. Supp. 3d at 163; Summers, supra note 132, at 192.
168
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,946, 20,949 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509, 2510, 2550).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 20,946.
164
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though rollovers commonly involve the most important financial decisions that
investors make in their lifetime.”171
Similarly, when the DOL first interpreted “renders investment advice” in
1975, defined-contribution plans and IRAs together accounted for
approximately 20% of the total retirement assets in the United States.172 By June
2018, those same accounts comprised approximately 60% of total retirement
assets.173 This proportional growth in popularity of defined-contribution plans
and IRAs as alternatives to defined-benefit plans, which have concurrently
declined in popularity, has blurred the lines—at least from an investor’s
perspective—between regulation of retirement and non-retirement accounts.
Recognizing that its 1975 interpretation of “renders investment advice” was
failing to govern the new retirement investment landscape, the DOL issued a
final rule in April 2016 to reinterpret what constitutes rendering investment
advice, thereby expanding the scope of who must adhere to fiduciary standards
under ERISA.174 Under the fiduciary rule, “rendering investment advice”
required broker-dealers to maintain fiduciary standards while providing onetime recommendations, like rollovers.175 These one-time recommendations also
would have included any investment recommendations regardless of whether
the advice was individualized, based on a mutual understanding of the parties,
or the primary basis for the pension plan’s decision.176 Accordingly, under the
final rule, an individual who or entity that makes an investment recommendation
would have been able to escape liability for violating fiduciary responsibility
only if the DOL expressly exempted the prohibited transaction.177

171

Id. at 20,949.
Retirement Assets Total $28.3 Trillion in Second Quarter 2018, supra note 108.
173
Id.
174
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 20,946. “In adopting the Fiduciary Rule, the DOL emphasized changes in the U.S. retirement savings
landscape since the enactment of ERISA, particularly the shift from employer sponsored defined benefit pension
plans to participant-directed defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans.” U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: ASSET MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 65
(2017).
175
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 20,948. While the fiduciary rule explains what constitutes a “recommendation,” for the purposes of this
Comment, it is enough to know that “recommendation” generally refers to the act of giving advice regarding the
purchase, sale, or holding of securities or other investment property. Id. at 20,948.
176
Summers, supra note 132, at 200–01.
177
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 20,946–47 (discussing a new exemption that would enable broker-dealers to avoid liability for otherwise
prohibited transactions under certain conditions).
172
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Along with reinterpreting “renders investment advice” in April 2016, the
DOL issued a conditional exemption from prohibited transactions called the
Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE).178 The BICE created the opportunity
for exemption-based relief from liability for fiduciaries engaging in principal
trading if they satisfied two conditions.179 The first condition was that a fiduciary
“must adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards,” which ensures that a fiduciary
is not receiving third-party compensation to the detriment of the pension plan or
IRA beneficiary, “when making investment recommendations.”180 The second
condition applied to fiduciaries managing IRAs. In that context, the fiduciary’s
financial institution would have been required to enter into a written contract
with the IRA beneficiary.181 This would have guaranteed wronged IRA
beneficiaries a contractual right to sue an offending fiduciary for breach of
contract where it otherwise would have lacked standing to file a claim under
Title II.182
Despite the DOL issuing the fiduciary rule and the BICE in June 2016 under
the Obama Administration,183 the state of those rules remained in flux
throughout the first year and a half of the Trump Administration. They were
scheduled to become applicable in April 2017, with full compliance required by
January 2018.184 But in early February 2017, just a few weeks after taking office,
President Trump issued a memorandum directing the DOL to reexamine those
rules.185 In response, the DOL pushed the applicable date back sixty days to June
2017, and later extended the effective date for full compliance back eighteen
months, to July 2019.186
While President Trump’s purported motivation for issuing the memorandum
was to determine whether the Obama Administration’s final rule was consistent
178
Id. at 20,946. The BICE supplemented the Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (PTE 84-24), an
exemptive regulation adopted by the DOL in 1977 that provided for exemptive relief for investment advisers
who receive third-party compensation “when plans and IRAs purchased recommended insurance and annuity
contracts.” Final PTE 84-24, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147, 21,148 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
179
See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81
Fed. Reg. at 20,947.
180
Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,007 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2550). Specifically, the Impartial Conduct Standards require a broker to “act in the customer’s best
interest when making recommendations; receive no more than reasonable compensation; and refrain from
making misleading statements.” Id. at 21,026.
181
Id. at 21,020.
182
Id.
183
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 20,946; Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,002.
184
Ebeling, supra note 11.
185
Trump Memorandum, supra note 9.
186
Ebeling, supra note 11; Thornton, supra note 11.
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with the policies of his Administration,187 the delay caused one consequence that
was almost certainly unintended: it provided the courts more time to determine
whether the DOL exceeded its authority under ERISA by promulgating the
fiduciary rule and the BICE. After being upheld by the Tenth Circuit,188 the DOL
fiduciary rule was vacated in toto by the Fifth Circuit in March 2018.189 In a 2to-1 split decision, the Fifth Circuit also vacated the BICE.190 It held that the
DOL exceeded its authority under ERISA in promulgating the fiduciary rule and
the BICE.191 The DOL had forty-five days from the time of the decision—that
is, until April 30—to file an appeal, but it did not.192 A third-party effort by
AARP and multiple states, including California and New York, to defend the
fiduciary rule was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in May.193 Given that the DOL’s
fiduciary rule was vacated, and the agency is (for better or worse) back to
enforcing its 1975 regulation, the next section discusses how the DOL’s
administration and enforcement of ERISA and that 1975 regulation compare to
the enforcement mechanisms employed by the SEC.
3. Enforcement by the DOL
To protect pension plan and IRA beneficiaries, Congress granted the DOL
the authority to carry out the provisions of Title I and to promulgate rules and
regulations to protect pension plan investors,194 leaving the IRS to enforce tax
penalties in the Internal Revenue Code for fiduciaries who fail to satisfy their
duties to IRA beneficiaries under Title II.195 Notably, the DOL has the authority
to conduct compliance investigations.196 The Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA) is the agency within the DOL that is primarily

187

Trump Memorandum, supra note 9.
Akira Tomlinson, Federal Appeals Court Upholds Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule, JURIST (Mar.
15, 2018, 7:51 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/03/federal-appeals-court-upholds-department-of-laborfiduicary-rule/.
189
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 379 (5th Cir. 2018).
190
Fifth Circuit Vacates Fiduciary Rule, DRINKERBIDDLE (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.drinkerbiddle.
com/insights/publications/2018/03/fifth-circuit-vacates-fiduciary-rule.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Schoeff Jr., supra note 14.
194
29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2012). The DOL collaborates with the IRS and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation to enforce ERISA. SAMUEL HENSON, LOCKTON RET. SERVS., ERISA’S THREE-HEADED GUARDIAN
4 (explaining further that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation enforces Title IV, and that Title III
establishes the parameters by which the three entities collaborate to enforce ERISA).
195
HENSON, supra note 194.
196
Id. at 5.
188
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responsible for enforcing pension-related legislation and regulation.197
Particularly, EBSA’s Offices of Regulations and Interpretations, Exemption
Determinations, and Enforcement collaborate to administer and enforce the
fiduciary-related provisions of Title I.198
As described in the preceding section, the standards of conduct that EBSA
enforces include a fiduciary’s obligations to comply with the prudent man
standard of care and avoid entering into prohibited transactions, while providing
exemptions for certain otherwise prohibited transactions. Like the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, which files civil actions under the Commission’s
authority, EBSA’s Office of Enforcement has the authority to file civil actions
and prosecute cases against offending fiduciaries under the Secretary of Labor’s
authority.199 EBSA’s Office of Enforcement is also supported by individuals
who have a private right of action to sue investment advisers for violations of
their fiduciary obligations.200 Despite the DOL’s and SEC’s enforcement
mechanisms being in place, both agencies have failed to promulgate regulation
that properly protects retirement investors from suffering financial losses due to
receiving conflicted investment advice.
II. EFFECTS AND THE AFFECTED: PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Having described the overlap between and gaps in the regulation of brokerdealers and investment advisers by the SEC and DOL in Part I, this Part proceeds
by identifying the ensuing problems for investors, financial service providers,
and the federal government.201 These problems include (1) lack of transparency
regarding the distinction between broker-dealers and investment advisers, and
the investment losses suffered partly because of that opacity, (2) rising
compliance costs for broker-dealers, and (3) inadequate administration of
197
History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 121 (“Until February 2003, EBSA was known as the Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA). Prior to January 1986, PWBA was known as the Pension and
Welfare Benefits Program. At the time of this name change, the Agency was upgraded to a sub-cabinet position
with the establishment of Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary positions.”).
198
Organization Chart, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/
about-us/organization-chart (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
199
Id. The Office of Regulations and Interpretations interprets the scope of fiduciary responsibility and
prohibited transactions, and the Office of Exemption Determinations analyzes applications for individual and
class exemptions from ERISA’s prohibited transactions. Id. Together, EBSA’s offices are “developed and
implemented to assure the security of the retirement . . . benefits of America’s workers and their families.” EMP.
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FY 2018 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 15 (2018).
200
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
201
Because FINRA promulgates its rules under SEC oversight, this Part assumes that FINRA’s
contribution to the problems, to the extent that it does contribute, is attributable to the SEC.
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fiduciary-related law due to the promulgation of deficient regulation by the SEC
and DOL.
A. The Problem for Investors
Most investors do not understand the distinction between broker-dealer and
investment advisory services, and this misunderstanding, coupled with receiving
conflicted investment advice, is costing them their savings. In a study
commissioned by the SEC in 2008, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice found
that despite investors’ high level of satisfaction with their own financial service
providers, they “typically fail[ed] to distinguish broker-dealers and investment
advisers along [regulatory lines].”202 While lack of transparency is not inherently
bad, it is when it results in billions of dollars of investment losses annually for
unwitting investors, and that is exactly what is happening. The remainder of this
section explains how the distinction between services offered by broker-dealer
and investment advisers has become blurred since the early 1990s, and how that
opacity has likely resulted in retirement investors losing money.
The New York Stock Exchange invested $1 billion in technology throughout
the 1980s and 1990s to advance the efficiency of processing investment orders
by broker-dealers.203 Since then, trade execution has evolved from a process
reliant on human interaction to one driven by algorithms and electronic
processing, now resulting in nearly instantaneous trade execution upon
ordering.204 Coinciding with this technological advancement, services offered

202
ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE xiv (2008). The SEC commissioned the RAND Institute to
conduct a study to asses (1) the current business practices of broker-dealers and investment advisers, and (2)
whether “investors understand the differences between and relationships among broker-dealers and investment
advisers.” Id. To do so, the RAND Institute collected and analyzed a wide range of data from a diverse set of
financial service providers. Id. It also surveyed a diverse set of investors to better understand their perception of
the roles of broker-dealers and investment advisers and said financial service providers obligations to investors.
Id.; see also Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81
Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,949 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550) (“Plan participants
and IRA owners often lack investment expertise and must rely on experts—but are unable to assess the quality
of the expert’s advice or guard against conflicts of interest.”).
203
Laby, supra note 21, at 422–23.
204
See id. at 419–24. To buy and sell securities, investors used to rely on brokers on the trading floor. Id.
at 421. An investor would arrive at a branch office of an NYSE member firm, place an order with an order clerk
at that firm, and then the order clerk would transmit the order to a floor broker. Id. The floor broker, acting as
the investor’s representative on the trading floor, would execute the order by physically going onto the trading
floor and placing the order. Id. After executing the order, the floor broker would report the order details back to
the order broker, who would then report back to the investor. Id. at 421–22. Sensibly, floor brokers earned a
commission on each transaction they executed. Id. at 400. This antiquated process is no longer the common
method for buying and selling stock, however. Id. at 422.
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by broker-dealers have evolved and now commonly resemble the services
provided by investment advisers.205
In the past three decades, it has become increasingly common for brokerdealers to market investment advisory services and earn fee-based
compensation, both of which are characteristic offerings of investment
advisers.206 In 2010, approximately 20% of the broker-dealers registered with
the SEC and approximately 37% of those registered with FINRA indicated that
they were engaged in investment advisory services.207 And in 2016, an
independent survey of broker-dealers found that over one-third of the
participating broker-dealers’ revenue was comprised of fee-based
compensation.208
Again, while lack of transparency stemming from the evolution of brokerdealer services into something more akin to investment advisory services is not
inherently bad, an investor failing to understand what duties her financial service
provider owes her can and has resulted in significant losses for those saving for
retirement. In February 2015, the CEA estimated that $1.7 trillion of IRA assets
are invested in products that generate conflicts of interests, and those conflicted
investments result in aggregate losses to retirement investors of about $17 billion
annually.209 It also found that retirement investors “receiving conflicted advice
earn returns roughly [one] percentage point lower each year.”210 A year later, in
April 2016, the DOL forecasted that conflicted investment advice could cost
IRA investors in the mutual funds segment alone “between $95 billion and $189
billion over the next [ten] years and between $202 billion and $404 billion over
the next [twenty].”211 Even if the DOL’s figures are substantial overestimates,
205

Id. at 404.
Id. at 404–08.
207
SEC 913 STUDY, supra note 29, at 8 & n.14.
208
Greg Iacurci, DOL Fiduciary Rule Pushing Broker-Dealer Assets to Fee-Based Accounts, Away from
Commissions, INV. NEWS (May 24, 2017, 2:43 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170524/FREE/
170529958/dol-fiduciary-rule-pushing-broker-dealer-assets-to-fee-based.
209
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1.
210
Id.
211
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,946, 20,950 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). In April 2016, the DOL
also reported that “rollovers [from defined-benefit plans to IRAs] are expected to approach $2.4 trillion
cumulatively from 2016 through 2020.” Id. at 20,949. Although the DOL did not forecast the expected aggregate
losses, it did report that, without modifying its fiduciary standard, a retirement investor who rolls over retirement
funds “into an IRA could lose 6 to 12 and possibly as much as 23 percent of the value of her savings over 30
years of retirement by accepting advice from a conflicted financial adviser.” Id. These calculations “are based
on a large body of literature cited in the 2015 NPRM Regulatory Impact Analysis, comments on the 2015 NPRM
Regulatory Impact Analysis, and testimony at the DOL hearing on conflicts of interest in investment advice in
August 2015.” Id. at n.8.
206
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and even if the CEA’s are too, the scale of loss does not change: retirement
investors have lost and will continue to lose billions of dollars annually due to
conflicted investment advice, especially now that the DOL’s fiduciary rule has
been vacated.
B. Problems for Financial Service Providers and the Federal Government
The shifting regulatory landscape has created problems for both brokerdealers and the federal government. As discussed momentarily, several studies
show that the DOL’s fiduciary rule, as well as changes in legislation and
regulation generally, have contributed to increased compliance costs that force
broker-dealers to adapt or even abandon their service offerings. Similarly, while
the costs associated with enforcing later-vacated regulations are not readily
available, it is likely that these changes have resulted in increased costs for the
SEC and DOL as well. The shifting regulatory landscape also has the effect of
expending political and regulatory capital in an era when reaching consensus has
become difficult. The remainder of this section takes these issues in turn.
The DOL’s fiduciary rule is the perfect example of a well-intentioned
regulation promulgated with the illusory belief that it will effect positive, longterm change, only to have those illusions turned into a reality of further muddied
regulatory waters. As discussed in section A, the DOL passed the fiduciary rule
to prevent losses for retirement investors stemming from conflicted investment
advice from broker-dealers. But the long-term benefit to investors will never be
realized. Instead, the fiduciary rule merely increased compliance costs for
broker-dealers in the short-term before being vacated by the Fifth Circuit.
In an August 2017 study commissioned by the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association, Deloitte analyzed broker-dealers’ response to
the DOL’s final rule and found it significantly increased compliance costs.212 It
found that “start-up” compliance costs for the DOL’s final rule alone cost
broker-dealers approximately $4.7 billion in 2016, and estimated that ongoing
costs to comply with the rule will be around $700 million dollars annually—
assuming then, of course, that the rule would not be vacated.213 This study also
surveyed broker-dealers who together managed approximately 27% of the assets

212
See DELOITTE, THE DOL FIDUCIARY RULE: A STUDY ON HOW FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE
RESPONDED AND THE RESULTING IMPACTS ON RETIREMENT INVESTORS 3, 6 (2017).
213
Id. at 19. Deloitte reported that these costs were incurred investing in the “people, processes, and
technology” necessary to comply with the fiduciary rule. Id. at 17. In terms of human capital, the funds were
spent on new or reallocated full-time employees and third-party activities, such as developing legal and business
strategy, rule understanding, and technology initiatives. Id. at 20.
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regulated by ERISA.214 Fifty-three percent of the respondents indicated that they
had limited or eliminated their advised brokerage services, “impacting 10.2
million accounts and $900 [billion]” in assets under management.215 To maintain
their relationships with these accounts, “62% of study participants broadened
access to advice through fee-based programs by lowering account minimums,
launching new offerings, or both.”216
With the fiduciary rule now vacated, Deloitte’s projected figure of $700
million in additional compliance costs annually for broker-dealers is likely no
longer accurate. It is not yet clear whether the benefits, if any, stemming from
nearly $5 billion in additional compliance in 2016 alone will be salvaged. For
example, out of an abundance of caution some broker-dealers may voluntarily
maintain their efforts to abandon or modify conflicted advisory services that
purport to be brokerage services, but there are no guarantees.
In addition to expending its regulatory capital, if the DOL’s fiduciary rule
was not vacated, it likely would have increased the costs associated with the
SEC and DOL administering increasingly duplicative enforcement mechanisms.
Thus, while some believe that the DOL’s fiduciary rule was a necessary step
towards protecting investors given the SEC’s apparent reluctance in
promulgating a uniform fiduciary standard that applies to broker-dealers who
provide personalized investment advice,217 the rule would have only provided a
partial solution while exacerbating the overlap between the SEC’s and DOL’s
enforcement mechanisms. The Fifth Circuit vacating the fiduciary rule provided
a unique opportunity for the SEC and DOL to coordinate their efforts from a
relatively clean slate before adopting industry-changing regulation. Given that
the SEC is currently working to promulgate a rule that will elevate brokerdealers responsibilities to clients who receive investment advice, now is the time
for said coordination.

214

Id. at 4.
Id. at 11.
216
Id. at 12. The fiduciary rule is only part of the calculus for determining compliance costs. A report
published by the Department of Treasury in 2017 states that recent legislation and regulation, encompassing
everything from Dodd-Frank to the DOL’s fiduciary rule, has “resulted in a median increase in compliance costs
of an estimated 20% over the past five years.” U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 174, at 25 & n.47 (noting
that these results were “based on a survey of 42 member firms accounting for 46% of registered fund assets”).
217
See supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text.
215
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III. FINE-TUNING: HARMONIZING REGULATION OF BROKER-DEALERS AND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS
As discussed in Part II, the existing legislative and regulatory framework has
created problems for investors, broker-dealers, and the federal government. This
Part proposes an approach for mitigating the effects of these problems by
arguing that the SEC should adopt a uniform fiduciary standard of care for
broker-dealers and investment advisers who provide personalized investment
advice to investors. Before imposing this standard, though, and considering the
high likelihood that Congress will not amend its early legislation because it has
opted to defer substantive policy changes to the SEC in the past, the SEC should
collaborate with the DOL to develop guidelines to help limit duplicative
enforcement efforts and identify when broker-dealer services implicate fiduciary
status.
A. Promulgation of a Uniform Fiduciary Standard by the SEC
In Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, Congress (1) required the SEC to commission
a study to evaluate the standards of care for broker-dealers and investment
advisers and (2) provided the SEC the authority to impose fiduciary status on
broker-dealers who provide investment advice to their customers.218 In the
corresponding January 2011 study conducted by a multi-divisional task force of
the SEC, the task force recommended “establishing a uniform fiduciary standard
for investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing investment advice
about securities to [investors] that is consistent with the standard that currently
applies to investment advisers.”219 Despite its authority to impose fiduciary
obligations and the recommendation by task force, the SEC has not yet done so
but should for three reasons.
One reason the SEC should impose a uniform fiduciary standard is to protect
investors against suffering losses due to receiving conflicted investment
advice.220 With an SEC-imposed uniform fiduciary standard in place, brokerdealers would be required to act in their customers’ best interests when providing
investment advice. This means that they would be prohibited from providing
investment advice where a conflict of interest exists—or at the very least they
would need to notify their investors before rendering them conflicted advice
rather than after. Thus, the discord between an investors’ satisfaction with their
218
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2013, § 913(b)(1), 124
Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012)).
219
SEC 913 STUDY, supra note 29, at ii.
220
Id. at viii.
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financial services providers and their ability to distinguish between brokerdealers and investment advisers along regulatory lines would be a non-issue. The
average investor would be safe to assume that he is receiving advice that is in
his best interest because, at least per the regulatory requirements, he should be.
Imposing more stringent standards on broker-dealers could arguably lead to
broker-dealers abandoning or modifying their services so much so that it would
significantly reduce investors’ access to financial services. Some argue that this
would disproportionately affect low- and middle-income investors.221 But even
if an elevated standard of conduct imposed on broker-dealers were to reduce
these investors’ access to financial services and investment options, this would
only be detrimental if one assumes those abandoned or otherwise modified
services are better than the alternative222: investors losing upwards of $17 billion
annually. It may be better for investors, even unsophisticated investors, to shift
to passive, low-cost investment options that are growing in popularity anyway.
Or perhaps just as likely, a market for new, low-cost advisory services would
develop in response to the imposition of more stringent standards of conduct on
broker-dealers who are essentially providing investment advisory services.
Another reason the SEC should implement a uniform fiduciary standard is
because it has the broadest scope of authority to do so and is uniformly regarded
as the primary securities regulator.223 While the history of legislation dating back
to the 1930s supports this view, one need not look further than the past ten years.
As of 2015, the SEC regulates nearly $67 trillion in assets in the U.S. investment
management industry, whereas the DOL regulates a growing yet still
significantly smaller portion of the industry at approximately $19 trillion.224
Further, as discussed in Part I and in the beginning of this section, Congress
provided the SEC the authority to assess and respond to the specific problem
addressed in this Comment under Section 913 of Dodd-Frank. The fact that the
DOL’s efforts to impose a fiduciary standard were vacated by the Fifth Circuit
should only hasten the SEC’s efforts to promulgate a uniform standard
unrestrained by another agency’s formal rulemaking.

221
Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Standard on
Financial Advice, FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.onefpa.org/journal/Pages/The%20Impact%20of%
20the%20Broker-Dealer%20Fiduciary%20Standard%20on%20Financial%20Advice.aspx (last visited Oct. 20,
2018).
222
Demina, supra note 21, at 458 (arguing that “there is no reason to view a reduction in investor choice
as antithetical to protecting investors”).
223
Krug, supra note 16, at 340.
224
SEC, supra note 20; Iekel, supra note 19.
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And finally, a third reason the SEC should impose a uniform fiduciary
standard is because of its authority to not only directly regulate the investment
industry, but also to regulate SROs that can self-regulate.225 Take as an example
of an SRO, FINRA. In 2016, FINRA had a net income of almost $60 million.226
By relying on quasi-governmental SROs like FINRA, the SEC could alleviate
the financial burden of regulating the investment industry.
Despite its authority to adopt the proposals outlined above, the SEC’s power
to impose fiduciary obligations on broker-dealers under Section 913 of DoddFrank is not absolute. While the SEC does indeed have authority to extend the
current fiduciary standard that applies to investment advisers to broker-dealers
who provide personalized investment advice,227 Congress neither authorized the
SEC to modify that standard when or if it extends the standard to those brokerdealers,228 nor did Congress influence the DOL’s (or any agency’s) authority to
impose fiduciary obligations on investment advisers. The latter issue is
undoubtedly less of a concern since the Fifth Circuit vacated the DOL’s attempt
to impose a fiduciary standard on broker-dealers. Still, the SEC should
collaborate with the DOL before promulgating whatever new standard it has in
the works to ensure a sound result that will remain relevant for longer than a
year and a half after it is passed.
B. Collaboration Between the SEC and the DOL
The SEC and the DOL should collaborate to provide external mechanisms,
for reference by broker-dealers and investors, and internal mechanisms, for their
use to help avoid creating or maintaining duplicative enforcement mechanisms.
Although the specifics of these mechanisms will not be addressed in detail
below, these agencies will likely need to create a joint taskforce or a standing
committee to properly do so.
The SEC and DOL should publish interagency guidelines to help brokerdealers and investors better understand how a uniform standard of conduct
would apply to them. These guidelines should address three key areas. First, in
225
See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012). While collaboration between the SEC and DOL is crucial to harmonizing
the existing regulatory framework, the SEC should also work with FINRA to require its members to enter into
contracts with their customers to provide those customers a private right of action against broker-dealers who
fail to adhere to fiduciary obligations, like the DOL attempted to do with the BICE. See Jordan, supra note 21,
at 524. This would provide individuals receiving investment advice a private right of action where one is not
provided by current legislation, which may help alleviate budget concerns. See id.
226
FINRA, supra note 105.
227
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012).
228
Id.
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Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, Congress expressly stated that earning brokerage
commissions does not inherently qualify a broker-dealer as a fiduciary.229 If this
is the case, then it is unclear what does qualify. Providing examples of when
brokerage services do and do not necessitate fiduciary behavior would thus be a
good start for these guidelines. Second, the agencies should explain how brokerdealers’ responsibilities to their customers would differ from an investment
advisers’ responsibilities to its clients, if at all, when the former’s service
implicate fiduciary obligations. In other words, the agencies should determine
whether a broker-dealer would have an ongoing obligation to serve as a fiduciary
if its services implicate fiduciary status, like an investment adviser does, or
whether the obligation would only exist at the time the investment advice is
rendered. The former would be a principles-based solution and would likely do
a better job than the SEC’s heightened disclosure requirements in protecting
investors and mitigating issues arising from a lack of transparency. Third, the
agencies should provide best practices on how broker-dealers could build on
their existing practices to efficiently and effectively ensure compliance moving
forward. This would prove especially useful in light of the DOL’s fiduciary rule
being vacated by the Fifth Circuit after broker-dealers spent billions of dollars
adapting their compliance to satisfy the new requirements.
The SEC and DOL should also work together to create internal mechanisms
that would help avoid duplicative enforcement efforts in enforcing overlapping
legislation and regulation. It might be useful to look to the collaboration by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
administering and enforcing federal antitrust laws.230 While it would not be
possible for the SEC and DOL to create an enforcement apparatus as bifurcated
as the one the DOJ and FTC follow, especially early on, the SEC and DOL
should attempt to allocate their expertise in the best ways possible; of course,
the bifurcation of enforcement responsibilities would need to comport with
statutory constraints on their respective authority.
A bifurcation of responsibility could be based on industry expertise or
expertise regulating certain types of accounts. If responsibility were based on
account type, for example, the SEC could ensure compliance for definedcontribution plans and IRAs, in addition to regulating all non-retirement

229

Id.
See generally The Enforcers, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (“In some respects their authorities overlap,
but in practice the two agencies complement each other. Over the years, the agencies have developed expertise
in particular industries or markets.”).
230
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investment accounts,231 and the DOL could ensure compliance for definedbenefit plans.232 This arrangement would enable the SEC to regulate accounts
that are likely to be maintained by individuals, who might have one set of
expectations for their financial service providers, and would leave the DOL to
regulate accounts that are typically maintained by employers, who might have
another set of expectations. It would also allow the SEC to place greater
emphasis on upholding its founding and current mandate—to protect
investors—while allowing the DOL to place greater emphasis on its mandate
under ERISA—to protect pension plan beneficiaries without discouraging
employers from maintaining or creating pension plan offerings.
CONCLUSION
The private-sector retirement investment market has changed dramatically
in scale and composition in the decades since ERISA was enacted in 1974, and
the legislative and regulatory response to the changes has been inadequate. The
negative consequences of these changes have been exacerbated by advances in
trading technology that have made it increasingly difficult for retirement
investors to recognize the difference between investment advisers and brokerdealers. As a result, retirement investors are suffering unnecessary investment
losses totaling billions of dollars annually.
Despite awareness of this issue, the DOL and SEC have failed to promulgate
regulation that will address the problem—that broker-dealers can provide
conflicted investment advice without consequence. While the DOL’s efforts
were struck down by the Fifth Circuit, the SEC has been slow act. To mitigate
investors losing out unnecessarily, the SEC should impose fiduciary obligations
on broker-dealers who provide investors personalized investment advice, and
should collaborate with the DOL to enforce that regulation. If it does not,
investors will continue to suffer.
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This is because employees and individuals bear the risk for defined-contribution plans and IRAs, like
with non-retirement accounts. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 1, at 4.
232
This is because plan sponsors bear the risk for defined-benefit plans. Id.
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